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CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTION:  
PERSONAL AND PROFESSIONAL ETHICS IN THE PUBLIC SQUARE 
 
Summary 
English law expects health professionals to have, and act upon, consciences, but formal conscience clauses are not the main legal 
recognition of this expectation. Rather, they should be regarded as an anomaly with roots in very specific political settlements between 
society and health professions, whose legitimacy is historically contingent, and as aspect of the ‘price’ to be paid for securing services. 
There are sound reasons for the protection of conscientious discretion as an aspect of professional identify, but specific rights of personal 
conscientious objection are difficult to reconcile with legitimate public expectations of comprehensive and non-discriminatory services. 
Professional identities include moral commitments, such as the privileging of patient safety over administrative convenience.  These should 
not be permitted to be overridden by personal moralities during the course of service delivery (as opposed to debating in the abstract 
what the proper courses of action should be). Consequently, formal conscientious objection clauses should be reduced to a minimum and 
regularly revisited. It is generally more satisfactory to address clashes between the personal moralities of professionals and public 
expectations through more flexible means, enabling accommodation of a plurality of views where possible but acknowledging that this is a 
matter of striking an appropriate balance. Employment law rather than health care law provides the best mechanism for regulating this 
process. 
Key Words: Abortion; Conscientious Objection; Personal Beliefs; Professional Ethics; Professional 
Discretion; Social Contract 
 
 
This paper is concerned with whether rights of conscientious objection vested in professionals are 
best seen as a private or public issue, and the significance of this distinction. It reflects on how issues 
of professionalism are connected with matters of conscience. I argue that the law expects health 
professionals to have, and act upon, consciences, but that formal conscience clauses are not the 
main legal recognition of this expectation. Rather, they should be regarded as an anomaly with roots 
in very specific political settlements between society and health professions, whose legitimacy is 
historically contingent. To assess whether they continue to be appropriate, an account needs to be 
given of the difference between the roles of both professional and personal values. I shall argue that 
there are sound reasons to support the protection of conscientious professional discretion, but this 
is different from the debate that is needed about ‘rights of conscientious objection’. Such specific 
rights are difficult to reconcile with legitimate public expectations of a service, especially in a system 
of socialised medicine, and it is argued that they should be revisited. The specific rights are also 
somewhat arbitrary as protections of personal conscience, which needs to be recognised on a wider 
basis, although less rigidly. I shall suggest that the decision of the UK Supreme Court in Greater 
Glasgow Health Board v Doogan is consistent with this approach, and seeks to limit the scope of 
rights to conscientious objection under the Abortion Act 1967. It does so while also diverting 
consideration to the wider issues of balancing religious freedoms with service needs within 
employment law.1   
The importance of the point that the legal provisions that are being discussed in this article are 
historically and socio-politically specific can be seen in some salient differences between the way in 
                                                          
1
 [2014] UKSC paras [23]-[27], noting issues that were ‘distractions’ for the disposition of the case, but 
anticipated to provide a way forward for individuals in the future, see para. [24].  
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which issues around conscientious objection arise in England, Scotland and Wales when compared 
to discussion in the international bioethics literature.2 The Abortion Act 1967 does not extend to 
Northern Ireland, and the legal position there is not specifically addressed in this piece.3 The first key 
difference between the legal position under consideration here and discussions based on the law in 
other jurisdictions is that it is common for that literature to examine conscientious objection in 
relation to procedures beyond abortion, and in particular emergency contraception. This is not the 
case in the UK, where rights of conscientious objection are limited to statutory provisions in relation 
to abortion, embryo research and the provision of fertility services.4 Further, those rights are not in 
fact defined by reference to professional status, although the interpretation of their limited scope 
means that they will most commonly be claimed by health professionals. In addition, while there is 
professional guidance that explores a wider scope for conscientious objection, it makes it clear that 
this is subject to employment obligations and is understood to be in a very different legal category to 
a ‘right’ to opt out of services.5  
This draws attention to a second feature that is different from some jurisdictions; the employment 
status of doctors. In many jurisdictions, doctors have privileged status and do not find themselves in 
a ‘master and servant’ relationship with the institutions in which they work. In private medical care 
in the UK, this is often the case; visiting medical staff in independent health providers in the UK will 
not normally be employees, although this is not automatic and will depend on the nature of the 
contractual arrangements in question.6 However, within the hospital sector of the National Health 
Service, where the vast majority of doctors work, medical practitioners are employees in the same 
way as other staff and subject to the same fundamental principles of employment law,7 including the 
expectation that they follow ‘lawful and reasonable instructions’. The idea that hospital doctors 
were independent contractors over whom the hospital had limited control did not survive the 
creation of the NHS.8 The language of ‘independent contractor’ survives in relation to general 
medical practice because GPs are not employees of the NHS. However, they deliver services under a 
statutory contract, with core services that all provide, with provision to extension to additional 
services against commissioners’ specifications. This does not permit doctors to pick and choose 
which services they are prepared to provide within those specified terms. Failures to supply the 
services would be a breach of these contracts. This means that a number of issues that arise in non-
socialised medicine systems about professional autonomy, including conscientious objection, do not 
manifest themselves in the same way in the NHS. 
For similar reasons, those problems that arise in systems where hospitals are managed by 
organisations that object to the provision of legally permissible services are less apparent in the UK. 
The vast majority of health care is funded, although not necessarily provided, through the NHS 
                                                          
2 For an overview of this literature, see L Kantymir and C McLeod ‘Justification for conscience exemptions in 
health care’ (2014) 28(1) Bioethics 16-23. 
3
 See Family Law Planning Association of Northern Ireland v Minister of Health, Social Services and Public Safety  
[2003] NIQB 48 and Re Society for the Protection of Unborn Children's Application for Judicial Review [2009] 
NIQB 92 (QBD). A further judicial review is underway at the time of writing, see Richard Martin, ‘Northern 
Ireland’s Human Rights Commission Granted Leave for Judicial Review to Challenge the Country’s Near-Blanket 
Ban on Abortion’ (OxHRH Blog, 9 February 2015), http://ohrh.law.ox.ac.uk/northern-irelands-human-rights-
commission-granted-leave-for-judicial-review-to-challenge-the-countrys-near-blanket-ban-on-abortion-2/ (last 
accessed 24 February 2015). 
4 Abortion Act 1967, s 4; Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 1990, s 38. 
5 This is discussed below, see the text at footnote 49. 
6 Hospital Medical Group Ltd v Westwood [2012] EWCA Civ 1005. 
7 For recent cases, see McMillan v Airedale NHS Foundation Trust [2014] EWCA Civ 1031; Chakrabarty v 
Ipswich Hospital NHS Trust [2014] EWHC 2735 (QB). 
8
 For discussion of this and related issues about the legal structure of medical power within the demarcations 
of health professional work, see J Montgomery ‘Doctors’ Handmaidens: the legal contribution’ in S McVeigh 
and S Wheeler (eds) Health, Health Regulation and the Law (1992) pp 141-68. 
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against standard service specifications, often in the context of clinical guidelines established by the 
National Institute for Clinical and Care Excellence. In the case of services for the termination of 
unwanted pregnancy, the obligation to commission services falls on Clinical Commissioning Groups 
each of which must commission services, including abortion services, ‘to such extent as it considers 
necessary to meet the reasonable requirements of the persons for whom it has responsibility’ 
(usually patients registered on the lists of GP practices which are members of the CCG, but in 
relation to emergency care ‘every person present in the area’).9 There is a model ‘integrated sexual 
health services: national service specification’ that explains what is expected to be commissioned 
and includes access to abortion services.10 The NHS system therefore means that the problems faced 
in predominantly private health systems, about securing access to abortion services from service 
providers who are reluctant to offer them, do not manifest themselves in the UK context. 
These are distinctive features of the UK health system that need to be recognised before we turn to 
the statutory conscience clauses. The nature of socialised medicine as manifest in the NHS is thus 
built on a vision of comprehensive services, framed by the NHS Constitution in terms of a social 
contract between citizens and the state, into which health professionals are bound.11 The usually 
vague idea of a contract between the state and those professions, under which status and privilege 
is conferred in return for the provision of services, has a very concrete reality in the NHS, with 
collective employment agreements for professional staff.12 The most important feature of the 
settlement between the state and the professions for understanding the approach to conscientious 
objection, however, is the general approach of English law to clinical discretion.  
 
 
Part I: Law and Professional Discretion: the conscientious exercise of 
power 
 
English law has framed ‘objection’ as a key professional role. It has consistently rejected the idea 
that health care law is a matter of consumer rights, in which patients demand and receive the 
service that they want. This is in part a consequence of the fact that most health care in the UK is 
provided through state commissions and the vast bulk of English health law is concerned with NHS 
treatment.13  Even the concept of ‘prescription-only medicine’,14 generally justified in terms of the 
need to restrict access to dangerous substances to situations where they have been judged clinically 
appropriate by a duly accredited health professional,15 has been extended in popular usage into a 
                                                          
9 NHS Act 2006, s 3 (as amended). See also ‘The Functions of Clinical Commissioning Groups (updated to reflect 
the final Health and Social Care Act 2012)’ available at http://www.england.nhs.uk/wp-
content/uploads/2012/06/ccg-functions-document-june2012.pdf (last accessed 24 February 2015). 
10 Available at 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/210727/National_integrated
_sexual_health_services_specification_2013.rtf (last accessed 24 February 2015). 
11 See Health Act 2009, s1, NHS Act 2006 (as amended) ss 1B, 13C, 14P and the documents themselves at 
https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/the-nhs-constitution-for-england (last accessed 24 February 
2015). 
12 See J Montgomery, ‘The virtues and vices of professionalism’. In D Bhugra & A Malik (eds) Professionalism in 
Mental Healthcare: Experts, Expertise and Expectations (2011) 17-31, esp. 25-28. 
13 For a discussion of the ability of this universal system to accommodate varieties of beliefs, see J V McHale, 
‘Faith, Belief, Fundamental Rights and Delivering Health Care in a Modern NHS: An Unrealistic Aspiration?’ 
Health Care Analysis (2013) 21:224-236. 
14
 Medicines Act 1968, s 58, 58A; see E Jackson, Law and Regulation of Medicines (2012) 92-3. 
15
 Human Medicines Regulations 2012, SI 212/1916, Reg 214.  
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funding mechanism – the prescription that ensures that the NHS pays for treatment. These two 
intertwined usages of ‘prescription’ both share a key characteristic; the professional plays a 
gatekeeping function. Thus, the professional is expected to object to ‘inappropriate’ access to the 
treatments sought.  
In a very clear assertion of this approach, Lord Donaldson summarised the position as follows: 
The doctors can recommend treatment A in preference to treatment B. They can also refuse 
to adopt treatment C on the grounds that it is medically contra‑indicated or for some other 
reason is a treatment which they could not conscientiously administer.16  
This seems to identify conscience as an independent reason for declining to give patients what they 
seek. It also draws on the tacit understanding that runs through English law that health professionals 
are ethically as well as scientifically orientated. This is a view held generally by the judiciary, but 
perhaps most explicitly set out in judgments from Lord Donaldson.  It leads to an approach premised 
on the integration of medical ethics and the law, in which professional discretion is protected in 
order to ensure that professional morality can prevail and not merely because of deference to 
technical skill.17 From this perspective, it does not seem inappropriate to leave areas for professional 
but not legal regulation. Lord Donaldson extolled the virtue of the position he crafted on concurrent 
consents in relation to treatment decisions for young adults as ensuring that ‘the doctor will be 
presented with a professional and ethical but not a legal problem.’18 Indeed, the judicial defence of 
some of the implications of this view was that ethical restrictions would ensure that doctors 
refrained from abusing the licence that the law permitted, for example in the hypothetical situation 
of the law permitting an unwanted abortion.19  
The most direct judicial discussion of this general position is probably that in the Burke litigation. 
Leslie Burke challenged part of the GMC guidance on Withholding and Withdrawing Life-prolonging 
Treatments: Good Practice in Decision-making that made it a matter of medical discretion whether 
artificial nutrition and hydration should be offered to patients. Although Burke succeeded at first 
instance,20 the Court of Appeal made it clear that doctors were expected to review requests by 
patients for particular treatments against their clinical judgment about what would provide overall 
clinical benefit for them, but the decision what to offer remained a professional one:   
If, however [the patient] refuses all of the treatment options offered to him and instead 
informs the doctor that he wants a form of treatment which the doctor has not offered him, 
the doctor will, no doubt, discuss that form of treatment with him (assuming that it is a form 
of treatment known to him) but if the doctor concludes that this treatment is not clinically 
indicated he is not required (i.e. he is under no legal obligation) to provide it to the patient 
although he should offer to arrange a second opinion.21 
The Court of Appeal in this case did not allude to any expectation of bringing morality to bear, 
merely noting the importance of accepting clinicians’ rights to make judgments on likely clinical 
benefit. 
                                                          
16 Re J [1991] 3 All ER 930, 934. 
17 See J Montgomery, ‘Law and the Demoralisation of Medicine’ (2006) 26(2) LS 185-210, esp. 199-206. 
18 Re R [1992] Fam 11, 22. 
19 See Re W [1993] Fam 64, see Lord Donaldson at 79 and Balcombe at 89-90. In Re X (a child) [2014] EWHC 
1871 (Fam), the patient’s consultant indicated ‘that it would not be right to subject X to a termination unless 
she was both "compliant" and "accepting". This could be interpreted as evidence to support the assumption 
that medical ethics would prevent abuse of the potential for parental consent. Munby P may have regarded 
this need for acceptance as a legal requirement, see para [12]. 
20
 R (Burke) v General Medical Council [2004] EWHC 1879 (Admin). 
21
 R (Burke) v General Medical Council [2005] EWCA Civ.1003, para [50]. 
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In AVS (by his litigation friend CS) v A NHS Foundation Trust the reference to conscience was 
restored, but with an implicit, subtle, but important difference of emphasis - ‘It is trite that the court 
will not order medical treatment to be carried out if the treating physician/surgeon is unwilling to 
offer that treatment for clinical reasons conscientiously held by that medical practitioner.’22 The 
difference here is that the reference to conscience is not to a separate and personal value system of 
the clinician, but to the fact that the opinion on the clinical reasons for treatment was 
‘conscientiously held’. This is more an issue of the good faith of the professional than conflicting 
value systems, a matter that will be seen to have important ramifications for the consideration of 
terms of the Abortion Act 1967 later in this piece. 
This recognition of that judges should not override professional judgments has been elevated into 
what has become an established judicial practice and almost a point of legal principle: 
To use a declaration of the court to twist the arm of some other clinician, as yet unidentified, 
to carry out these procedures or to put pressure upon the Secretary of State to provide a 
hospital where these procedures may be undertaken is an abuse of the process of the court 
and should not be tolerated.23  
More recently, the Supreme Court in Aintree NHST v James has reiterated this general position that 
courts, like patients, do not have the power to require doctors to provide specific treatments, only 
to accept or reject those which doctors think are clinically indicated.24 There seems no indication in 
the early cases interpreting the significance of the Aintree decision of judicial anxieties that suggest a 
desire to change this approach.25  
It seems clear, therefore that the judiciary believes that it is right to protect clinical freedom. This 
pattern is not inadvertent but is a deliberately chosen position. Further, this approach is, at least in 
part, built on a belief the exercise of medical professional discretion is informed by moral 
considerations. Jose Miola has shown that this does not lead to a rule based system, in which 
professional norms operate in a quasi-legal manner to provide a single ‘right-answer’, but rather are 
conflicting and indeterminate.26 This analysis does not undermine the picture painted above as a 
description of judicial attitudes. However, it raises important questions about its normative power 
and the legitimacy of law based on these premises. 
Some of these concern the difficulties that the protection of conscientious discretion creates for 
holding professionals to account for discriminatory, or otherwise unacceptable, patterns of 
behaviour. Thus, permitting a high degree of discretion enables the prejudices of professionals on 
‘deserving’ and ‘underserving’ supplicants for services to go unchecked. The ‘tired housewife’ might 
get easier access to abortion services than the ‘tart’ who is perceived to be reaping what she 
permitted to be sowed.27 From a different perspective in the battle over abortion rights, it is 
asserted that the need to demonstrate breaches of ‘good faith’ permits doctors to offer ‘abortion on 
demand’ and bypass the regulatory safeguards with relative impunity. This interpretation of the 
impact of protecting conscientious discretion was no doubt fuelled by the explanation given by the 
Director of Public Prosecutions for not prosecuting doctors ‘exposed’ in a Daily Telegraph ‘sting’ in 
which journalists presented seeming to make a request for a termination of pregnancy in order to 
                                                          
22 [2011] EWCA Civ 7, para [35]. 
23 Ibid. [38]. 
24 Aintree UH NHSFT v James [2013] UKSC 67, approving the earlier statements to this effect by Lord Donaldson 
in Re J [1991] Fam 33, at 48, and Re J [1993] Fam 15, at 26-27. 
25 United Lincolnshire Hospitals NHS Trust v N (Official Solicitor) [2014] All ER (D) 251 (Jul), para [53]. 
26 J Miola, Medical Law and Medical Ethics: A Symbiotic Relationship (2007). See also J Harrington, ‘Of Paradox 
and Plausibility: The Dynamic of Change in Medical Law’ (2014) 22(3) Med Law Rev 305-24. 
27
 See Sally Sheldon’s Beyond Control: Medical Power and Abortion Law (1997) esp. chapter3 – ‘Tarts and Tired 
Housewives’. 
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avoid giving birth to a girl.28 The DPP reasoned that proceedings would have been unlikely to have 
succeeded because of the challenges of proving bad faith.29 In different ways, each of these positions 
raises questions about the compatibility of the recognition of conscientious discretion with the rule 
of law. First, the inability to control unlawful discrimination and, second, the limitation of judicial 
oversight to check that the statutory tests are applied in clinical decision making. 
It is clear from this analysis that, in the area of abortion, the degree of medical control over 
terminations lies much less in the rights of conscientious objection in section 4 of the Abortion Act 
1967 than in a much broader recognition of conscientious discretion. The fact that the legality of an 
abortion depends on the good faith of doctors rather than whether the tests set out in the 
legislation were met in the judgment of either the woman, prosecutor or court provides the main 
scope for the exercise of conscience. Thus, in Re X Munby P made it clear that the question of 
whether the grounds in the Act were satisfied by the clinical circumstances was a matter for the 
doctors, not the court.30 He adopted the words of Holman J in Re SB that terminations can only 
happen ‘if a doctor or doctors, in the exercise of their own professional judgment, voluntarily decide 
to perform the abortion.’31 It is this protection of clinical freedom, not the specific conscience 
clauses that needs to be explained and justified. 
This does not, however, equate to the protection of personal morality but rather to the promotion 
of clinical judgment exercised in the course of a morally suffused activity. The legal protection of 
professional discretion exists in order to facilitate the delivery of care, not merely to prevent 
external scrutiny.32   Two models might be used to explain how this is compatible with the rule of 
law. The first of these might be characterised using a metaphor of the doctor as playing a quasi-
judicial role, applying normative principles to cases that come before them in attempt to adjudicate 
on a dispute over the proper conclusions to be drawn on the application of the law to the facts 
presented. The second can be seen as representing the doctor as the incarnation of a form of public 
authority, entrusted with an administrative discretion in a demarcation of spheres of legitimate 
authority. 
Under the first model, we might consider whether we should expect doctors to exercise their 
discretion in accordance with rules or principles (and perhaps values) that are implicit within the law, 
as Ronald Dworkin argues that judges should do in a ‘Hard Case’ where there is no straightforward 
answer from previous legal authority.33  Here the compatibility with the rule of law comes from the 
denial that cases will be resolved by forward looking policy judgments based merely on predicted 
and desired outcomes.  Rather, decisions are shaped by drawing on pre-existing normative resources 
which are then applied to the new circumstances without bias. If the argument summarised above it 
is accepted, that the judges have adopted an approach in which the normative resources of the 
health professions have been integrated into the architecture of the law, then this would seem to 
place the doctor into the role of a judge in the Dworkinian vision.  
                                                          
28 ‘Abortion investigation: doctors filmed agreeing illegal abortions 'no questions asked'’ 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/health/healthnews/9099511/Abortion-investigation-doctors-filmed-agreeing-
illegal-abortions-no-questions-asked.html (last accessed 13 January 2015). 
29 Statement from Director of Public Prosecutions on abortion related cases 
http://blog.cps.gov.uk/2013/10/statement-from-director-of-public-prosecutions-on-abortion-related-
cases.html (last accessed 13 January 2015). A view that was substantially vindicated in the cases discussed in 
the next paragraph. 
30 [2014] EWHC 1871 (Fam), para [6]. 
31 [2013] EWCOP 1417, para [6]. 
32
 J Montgomery, ‘The Virtues and Vices of Professionalism’ in D Bhugra & A Malik (eds) Professionalism in 
Mental Healthcare: Experts, Expertise and Expectations (2011) 17-31. 
33
 R Dworkin, ‘Hard Cases’ in Taking Rights Seriously (1978). 
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Alternatively, it might be suggested that the role that the law expects doctors to take is more akin to 
that of a public authority, which has been allocated the power to make decisions according to its 
own expertise, or other independent legitimacy (e.g. democratic), subject to procedural rather than 
substantive legal constraints.34 On this view, there is a demarcation of decisions as a being matter of 
professional discretion and conscience, drawing on a discrete and separate set of normative 
resources, rather than quasi-judicial determination on the application of the law. The key issues will 
concern the delineation of the expected processes, so that the law can exercise some degree of 
oversight without trespassing on the territory marked out for clinical discretion. Judges need to be 
able to determine whether those expected processes have been followed, but steer clear of 
interfering with the exercise of the substantive discretion that has been marked out as being beyond 
the ‘competence’ of the court. This might be termed a strategy of displacement from legal to 
medical systems for resolving difficult decisions. The normative principles on which doctors draw in 
this model come from outside the law, but there is an implicit expectation that discretionary powers 
will be exercised consistently with the rationale for conferring them on the doctors. 
John Harrington has suggested that we might usefully understand this area of law as a specific 
example of a more general problem of managing an inherent paradox in the operation of legal 
systems. Such systems depend on the binary division of circumstances, into being either lawful or 
unlawful, if they are to achieve closure on concrete decisions through the application of legal 
doctrine to resolve specific disputes. Yet, courts find themselves dealing with a multiplicity of 
contingent and complex interactions across many domains of reasoning (e.g. legal, social, moral, and 
political). As a result there is a paradox; actual decisions are highly contingent, yet the normative 
legitimacy of the law is thought to lie in its objectivity and predictability.  As he points out, 
‘paradoxes are a source of persistent embarrassment for theories that ideally equate law with logic 
and which take consistency as the system’s overarching value.’35 To manage this, the law seeks to 
suppress the visibility of its inherent paradoxes. Various programmes enable this, including 
displacing the messy contingencies into non-judicial processes in order to make it plausible to 
sustain the systemic purity of legal doctrine. Applying this to the context of Abortion, Harrington 
suggests ‘the Act effects a deparadoxification by displacement: legal contingency in this sensitive 
area is absorbed by the ‘black box’ of professional opinion. The precise form of this deferral has 
been upheld and enforced in the relevant case law. While courts are reluctant to investigate the 
specific content of the medical decision, they have stipulated that an authentic clinical evaluation 
must be made in every case.’36  
                                                          
34 For a general study of the conceptual issues, see D Galligan, Discretionary Powers (1986). For analysis of the 
more recent literature see J King, Judging Social Rights (2012).  There is a possible judicial analogy too, in 
relation to welfare decisions in relation to child-rearing in broken families. Here, the grounds for appeal are 
circumscribed in a similar way in order to recognise that there may be range of permissible decisions, see G v G 
[1985] 1 WLR 647. 
35 J Harrington, ‘Of Paradox and Plausibility: The Dynamic of Change in Medical Law’ (2014) 22(3) Med Law Rev 
305-24, 312. Of course, not all scholars believe that logic is a hallmark of the law. Indeed, Oliver Wendell 
Holmes Jr. famously claimed that ‘The life of the law has not been logic; it has been experience’ in the first 
paragraph of The Common Law (1881). Nevertheless, in his judicial practice, Holmes demonstrated the point 
that law should defer decisions to other more suitable authorities; for example in his famous dissent in 
Lochner v New York 198 US 45 (1905). The theory of judicial deference espoused by Holmes was based on a 
position of moral relativism, even possibly nihilism (see Allan C Hutchinson ‘Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr: the 
Magnificent Yankee’ in Laughing at the Gods: Great Judges and how they made the Common Law (2012)). It 
therefore adopts a rather different position from that being set out here, which is deference to a specific value 
system rather than to a process for dealing with a multiplicity of values. I am grateful to an anonymous 
reviewer for the Medical Law Review for suggesting that I consider the contrast with Holmes’ position. 
36
 Ibid. 317. I am very grateful to John Harrington for his stimulating discussion of the idea of the ‘black box’ 
with me over a conference dinner. 
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There is an important common feature to both these approaches that requires the person exercising 
the discretion to be able to articulate the legitimacy of their decision by reference to positional 
rather than personal authority. For Dworkin’s Hercules, it is showing how decisions are not matters 
of policy but the principles of law. This protects the judge from the suggestion that they are 
exercising a personal discretion but instead acting in a constrained professional role, as the 
spokespeople of the inherited legal tradition. There is little doubt that judges feel this particularly 
acutely when asked to operate in contested moral areas, seeking to explain how they should avoid 
allowing their personal opinions to intrude into their professional work. It is less clear that their 
practice is consistently restrained, and this is an area that requires more detailed analysis.37 
The second model requires the decision-maker to show that they have exercised their discretion in 
accordance with the structure that conferred it upon them. This enables the courts to identify ways 
in which discretionary powers might be exceeded and abused. Examples include the introduction of 
personal bias, systematic unlawful discrimination, irrelevant considerations (which requires an 
assessment of which considerations are deemed relevant by the framework that confers the 
discretion), and failure to consider relevant factors or evidence. As with the judicial analogy, there is 
a requirement to show that the authority has exercised its discretion in accordance with the public 
‘role’ that it has undertaken. Thus, the decision whether to offer a woman an abortion within the 
legal framework of the Abortion Act 1967 is to be made in the role of doctor, not as an individual 
citizen. 
This analysis suggests that the consistent and persistent protection of clinical judgment in medical 
and health care law, and thus the scope of the general conscientious objection, is related not to the 
personal expertise and morality of doctors, nurses, midwives and other recognised professional 
groups, but to the way in which they are thought to embody a tradition of both technical expertise 
and moral values. The normative legitimacy of this extensive respect for professional discretion lies 
principally in the belief that protecting this embodied tradition provides a reliable protection for 
patient interests. These are understood as being more than merely the expression of individual 
patient wishes. Some desires that patients might have are not respected by the law, such as requests 
for ineffective treatments, see Burke v GMC as discussed above. Consequently, the choices available 
to patients can be properly be limited to those offered by professionals. For this reason, the legal 
construction of the relationship between patients and health professionals is one in which the 
conscience of professionals is generally privileged over that of patients. Such an approach, which 
allows for a degree of indeterminacy, is preferred by English judges to a rule-based system of 
accountability that reduces the discretion of clinicians by requiring them to apply an algorithmic 
logic that generates clear and consistent responses to presenting facts. This accounts for the 
persistent use of the Bolam test in the English health care law. 
The general framing of the Abortion Act 1967 through the filter of ‘good faith’ is a specific, and 
unusually explicit, expression of this approach. The Act can be seen as enshrining a set of positions 
on the lens through which it is thought by Parliament to be appropriate to consider a decision to 
terminate a pregnancy (i.e. what constitutes a legally acceptable ground for an abortion). This is 
partly constructed by reference to clinical issues about risk and prognosis, and partly by reference to 
social judgments (e.g. about which injuries are ‘grave’, what constitutes an ‘abnormality’, the 
‘seriousness’ of ‘handicap’). These frame the choices that are to be made available to women, 
setting boundaries of acceptability. The guardians of these boundaries are to be the medical 
profession. Clinical discretion, exercised in good faith, links the political settlement reached by 
Parliament with the decisions in individual cases. The grounds for abortion are to be neither a 
                                                          
37 See J Montgomery, C Jones, and H Biggs, ‘Hidden Law-Making in the Province of Medical Jurisprudence’ 
(2014) 77 MLR 343-78 at 360-4 for examples of judicial articulations of these concerns and discussion of the 
extent to which they are reflected in judicial practice. NB that analysis predated the decision of the Supreme 
Court in Nicklinson [2014] UKSC 38 which may indicate a more interventionist approach. 
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personal judgment of the clinician, nor an unrestricted choice of the woman. Rather, the medical 
profession is to be the collective guardian of the political settlement reached through the legislative 
process.38 
The specific statutory conscience clauses in the Abortion Act 1967 (and the similar clauses in the 
Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 1990) play a very different role in this political compromise. 
They enable individual clinicians to exempt themselves from playing this guardianship role, at least 
in part. Only in part, because the scope of the conscience clause set out in section 4 of the Abortion 
Act 1967 is determined by society, not the individual position of the professional. Thus, professionals 
with a ‘conscientious objection’ to abortions may opt out of some of those to which they object, but 
not all. For example, under section 4(2), it is not permissible to exercise an objection based on the 
fact that it is unacceptable to the professional to kill an ‘innocent’ unborn child to save its mother 
from a grave permanent injury to her mental health.   
The limited scope of the legal right of conscientious objection is a significant factor in understanding 
its normative basis, which lies in the interrelationship of professional and personal ethics. Some 
issues about which individual health professionals have strong moral concerns are captured within 
the scope of the conscience clause, but not all. The statutory conscience clause is not concerned 
with those personal concerns, but with the relationship between the professions and wider societal 
decisions. As Lady Hale put it in the Doogan decision: ‘The conscience clause was the quid pro quo 
for a law designed to enable the health care profession to offer a lawful, safe and accessible service 
to women who would previously have had to go elsewhere.’39 It follows that the rationale of the 
clause lies neither in the special status of the embryo, nor in the personal interests of clinicians, but 
in the idea of professionalism and the social contract under which professional power is permitted 
to operate. The second part of this paper explores features of that implicit social contract that relate 
to the continuing legitimacy of conscientious objection in the context of abortion services. 
 
 
Part 2 A Politics of Professional Identities: Personal and Professional Ethics 
 
The analysis set out above, of the way in which the role of medical discretion is integrated into the 
normative structure of the law, draws more on the professional identify of clinicians than on their 
personal values. The legitimacy of the individual clinician’s decisions within abortion services is 
drawn from their operation of the ‘proper’ role assigned to them within this constitutional 
settlement. Two implications of this analysis will be drawn out here.  
The first concerns the normative significance of the clustering of potentially discrete values into an 
identity, with at least some degree of coherence and stability. This notion of identity is linked with 
the idea that power is granted to health professionals in order to embody a value tradition (whether 
rooted in legal normative resources or professional ethics). Individual professionals may find some 
values easier to accept than others, but they are to be treated as part of a single package insofar as 
they constitute the professional identity (or role). It will be argued that conscientious discretion 
should be protected when within this professional identity but that ‘conscientious objection’ as set 
out in section 4 of the Abortion Act needs to be understood as an act of heresy – a departure from 
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the orthodox professional identity. It therefore needs to be justified by reference to the possibility of 
accommodating heterodox positions without undermining the identity of the profession. . 
The second issue concerns the inherently political nature of professional identities. Such identities 
are not fixed, but fluid. They are forged through the dynamics of inter- and intra-professional 
rivalries, health care delivery and payment systems, changing social status and wider clashes of 
cultures and values in the societies within which the professionals operate. Legitimation strategies 
take various forms and address a range of contexts. An appeal to professional identity rather than 
personal ethics may serve to articulate a rationale for the prevailing settlement on abortion and help 
ascertain the limits of what is implicit in that settlement. However, it does little to explain how it 
came about and how it might change. An awareness of the politics of professional identities is 
needed to understand the (in)stability of the current settlement. 
In his discussion of conscientious objection, Daniel Weinstock draws an important distinction 
between arguments for respect for conscience that are based on the recognition of the moral 
agency of the objector and those that are derived from claims for religious freedom as the 
manifestation of objectors’ identity as part of a value tradition.40 He suggests that the principle of 
respect for the ability of people to act feely and with integrity, by following the dictates of their 
conscience, provides a reason to allow conscientious objection. He categorises this as an ‘internal’ 
reason, because it relates to the interests of the person making the decision, and roots it in the 
practice of being a moral agent. Weinstock also recognises an ‘external’ reason for respecting the 
conscientious refusal of moral agents, which is based on the interests of liberal democracies in 
encouraging and enabling citizens to think for themselves about complex issues of political morality. 
This is an ‘external’ interest because it relates to the state’s interest in the citizenry being possessed 
of certain dispositions and can be seen as an essential pre-condition of a pluralistic democratic state.  
Weinstock suggests that there is also an ‘internal’ interest of agents in being able to live in 
accordance with their religious creed, but he explains that the interest that it protects is not agency 
but identity. This interest is concerned with the agent’s ability to ‘identify’ themselves with values 
that endure beyond the specific decision to allow integrity over time. He suggests that this is 
important because it protects ‘the agent’s ability to continue to participate in rites and practices and 
to follow communal rules… in order to forge a stable sense of identity.’41 He argues that there are 
‘external’ interests connecting religious freedom and pluralist democracy, but these are different in 
kind to those generated by the importance of moral agency. They are not generated by the ideal of 
democratic deliberation but by the proper recognition of pluralism in liberal societies. In the 
particular context of health care, he suggests that accommodating the religious concerns of health 
professionals may make the professions more attractive to those from different faiths. This, in turn, 
might increase trust in public health institutions from faith communities, and promote toleration by 
professionals and even in wider society.   
Weinstock suggests a number of ‘external’ reasons for respecting conscientious objections by health 
professionals deriving from the importance of moral agency within the professional role. Health 
services benefit, he suggests, from empowering doctors and nurses to make moral judgements on 
the complex problems that their clients face. This is analogous to the protection of conscientious 
discretion that has been discussed above. He also suggest that we should also respect the moral 
agency involved in deliberating on the content of their professional codes of conduct. Health 
professionals must be empowered to reflect on the norms that govern their work.  He follows his 
analysis of the benefits of nurturing the moral agency of professionals with a discussion of the 
problem of dissention from ‘a medical practice around which there is a very broad consensus.’ He 
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argues that the acceptability of such dissent should not be based merely on prevailing consensus, 
but on ‘reasonability’. This includes remaining within the conception of medicine as being scientific 
(‘the dissenting judgment not be contrary to the best available scientific evidence’). He also suggests 
that there is a ‘core of services that are to some degree definitional of certain roles in the health 
sector that one cannot dissent from… without at the same time dissenting from the role itself.’42 He 
includes dispensing contraception in a family planning clinic as an example of such a core role. It is 
hard to see how this account of reasonability can be limited to the requirements of logic and agency. 
It seems far more closely connected to Weinstock’s discussion of identity grounds for respecting 
conscientious objections. 
His argument was concerned to elucidate the difference between claims that conscientious 
objection should be respected on grounds of moral agency and those based on maintaining a 
religious identity. However, they also arise in relation to professional identity. His examples of 
assessing how to respond to dissent are intimately connected to the way in which the health 
professions have ensured that the values on which their decisions are based endure over time so as 
to create a collective integrity that makes up the prevailing professional identity. On his account, the 
current identity is non-negotiably scientific and includes contraception but not abortion as core 
activities. However, from an historical perspective it can quickly be seen that this has not always 
been the case (and so might arguably change).43  
We have seen that English law has developed a strongly protective stance to a general conscientious 
discretion based on the image that it has of the current identities of the health professions. This 
image includes the view that they are the embodiment of a collegiate ethical tradition. 
Conscientious objection clauses seem to make some aspects of that tradition open to individual 
dissent. If they serve to undermine the overall professional identity, then they may be inherently 
destabilising for the social contract on which professional privileges and services are based. Possibly, 
however, they should be understood as clauses within that contract, which (although not entirely 
consistent with the overall character) enables it to hold despite the instability of the professional 
identity. They emerge to deal with particular historically contingent pressures. If this is the caser, 
attention should be paid to the way in which their significance for this social contract changes over 
time.  
The existence of specific conscience clauses can, thus, perhaps best seen as particular example of a 
more general pattern of the way law is one of the fields in which the boundaries of professional 
power and monopoly are established. Michael Thomson has shown how this is persistently 
demonstrated in the history of Abortion Law in the UK from its emergence as a legal concept at the 
beginning of the Nineteenth Century with the first statutory offence in 1803. He shows how the 
history of abortion law can be told as part of the professionalization project of medicine that 
extends beyond the Nineteenth Century, where it has been extensively explored, into the 
Twentieth.44 The medicalisation of decision-making, through definitions over whose meanings the 
medical profession exerts control, has provided doctors with monopolistic power. It was justified by 
a rhetoric of ‘ethicality’, but Thomson shows that the safeguards implicit in this rhetoric did not 
reflect practice. 
For the purpose of this piece, the interest of this historical perspective lies in the significance of the 
conscience clause in enabling the provision of abortion services to remain medicalised. When the 
profession is divided in its stance on an issue, it cannot speak with a single voice in protecting the 
service as a medical monopoly. As Sheelagh McGuiness and Michael Thomson demonstrate in their 
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analysis of the origins the 1967 Act, pro-choice campaigners judged that it was necessary to accept 
medicalisation in order to secure support from the medical establishment for reform. They also 
show that the internal divisions of the profession were intense. In this context, the conscience clause 
enabled the establishment to secure support for the regularisation of medical involvement even 
from members of the profession who were opposed to abortion by reassuring them that they would 
not be required to be involved personally.45 
We should therefore recognise that conscience clauses are historically situated and part of the ebb 
and flow of professional boundary work by which professional identities are constituted and 
reconstituted. They are not free standing provisions that can explained anachronistically as justified 
by some particular moral status of the embryo of moral nature of the actions. If that were the case, 
we might expect to see formal conscience clauses in relation to family planning services, gene 
therapies, intensive care practices that involve the withdrawal of life-sustaining medical treatment. 
However, these are matters that fall within the general protections of professional discretion. It is 
common to anticipate that if assisted dying were legalised, the relevant statute would be include 
some form of conscience clause,46 but this is not because there is something special about the issue 
of dying but because medical support for legalisation is dependent upon doctors not being required 
to be part of the practice. 
The principal questions we need to ask about the proper limits of discretion in the name of 
conscience are how we wish to hold professional power to account. I argued in the first section that 
the law reflected a position that clinical discretion, conscientiously exercised, was something judges 
aimed to protect in order to bring the normative resources of the professional traditions to bear. I 
suggested that the statutory conscientious objection clauses disrupted this by protecting the 
personal rather than professional consciences of practitioners. In this section, I have adapted a 
distinction between reasons for respecting conscience that are based on promoting agency and 
those which are based on protecting identity to argue that it is the latter that explains the rationale 
behind the general legal position. Professionals claiming rights of conscientious objection to 
participating in care that the profession would, in standard circumstances, provide are therefore to 
be understood as heretics. They are dissenters from the orthodoxy of the very calling that is thought 
to justify their privileged, discretionary based, accountability system. The general arguments for 
respecting professional discretion do not apply in these circumstances because they involve 
deploying personal values not those enshrined in the tradition of the professional in question. 
It followed that whether we had accepted their claims for conscientious objection to be respected 
was essentially a matter of the price we were prepared to pay as a society to secure the services that 
we wanted. From the perspective of reformers, the abortion conscience clause was part of the price 
for securing medical support for change (although it also was part of the price the medical 
establishment paid for carrying the wider profession with it in order to preserve abortion as a 
medical monopoly).  
Taken in a Twenty-First Century context, it becomes necessary to consider whether that price still 
needs to be paid. The argument of the final section of this piece is that once the historical 
contingencies of the Abortion Act conscience clauses are recognised, the case for a specific 
exemption is dramatically reduced. It is no longer necessary for such a clause to be in place to secure 
collective medical support for abortion services. Even if it were needed in the past, it is no longer 
necessary to have that support to provide effective services because of the development of 
independent niche providers of family planning services (including terminations). Instead, the issues 
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should be reframed into a question about the balancing of personal concerns of health professionals 
(of which abortion is only one example) with service needs and the rights of service users.  
 
Part 3 A politics of the personal: a synchronic perspective 
 
It is a common feature of legal analysis that it seeks to establish meanings synchronically – within 
the system of law at a particular moment in time, seeking to account for all its components as 
equally ‘valid’. It does this interpreting the relationships between contemporary prevailing 
authorities, doctrines and terms in ways so as to construe the law as a coherent and consistent 
whole. Outdated legal rules and principles cannot simply be abandoned or ignored, and if they 
cannot be made to fit, they must be changed in a legislative or quasi-legislative law-making process. 
Such a perspective encourages us to seek an explanation for rights of conscientious objection that 
makes them consistent with the current legal position. The previous section has argued that the 
statutory conscience clauses should, in fact, be considered diachronically – across time rather than 
within the snapshot of the ‘present’.47 On this view, our interpretation of the significance of the 
clauses should be strongly influenced by our understanding of the fluidity of meaning over time 
rather than its crystallisation in present usage.  
In this part of the paper, I bring the question whether conscientious objection is concerned with 
identity or agency together with the idea that we might treat them differently in the synchronic and 
diachronic spheres of meaning. The essence of the argument is that we should only protect the 
personal moral agency of professionals (by recognising the importance of them being able to engage 
with debates about their proper role, with strong rights to reject prevailing professional values) 
when we are concerned with the diachronic perspective – What should the law be? How and why is 
it changing? Here we should ensure that individuals are not constrained by their professional 
identities when they seek to change the ground rules within which they operate. As moral agents, 
they should be as free as other such agents to contribute. However, this is a sphere of objection 
which needs to be constitutionally framed with an established legitimate authority to alter the scope 
of professional or legal norms. The clinic is not such a sphere of activity, and it is constitutionally 
unacceptable to enable individual professionals personally to shape the scope of acceptable and 
available abortions on moral grounds when within a doctor-patient relationship. That is a matter for 
the democratic sphere. Conscientious objection within the clinic should only be permitted where it is 
the in the name of an identity claim, which is a matter of belonging to the value tradition of the 
profession and therefore not a matter of personal preference. 
Two examples will be used to explore this approach. First, analysis of GMC guidance on personal 
beliefs draws out the range of conflicts between personal morality and professional identity. Second, 
discussion of a case on the obligations of health professionals to follow lawful and reasonable 
instructions shows how they can be expected to comply with such directives during the delivery of 
patient care even when they have principled objections. This will set the scene for a brief discussion 
of the decision of the Supreme Court in Doogan to show how its narrow construction of the Abortion 
Act conscience clause is compatible with the thesis that professional and personal morality should 
be understood as operating in different spheres. 
The first example concerns the guidance from the General Medical Council that has emerged to deal 
with complaints from patients that doctors have been improperly imposing the beliefs on patients 
(for example suggesting prayer as a therapeutic intervention) and from doctors’ concerns about 
their personal beliefs being restricted. In this circumstance, the GMC has suggested that ‘personal 
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beliefs’ cannot be pursued where they are in conflict with the principles of ‘good medical practice’, 
treat patients unfairly, deny patients access to appropriate treatment or services, or cause patients 
distress. 48  This can be seen as an example of rejecting moral agency conceptions of clinical 
judgment in favour of those based on the moral identity of the profession. However, it is also clear 
that the content of the ‘moral identity’ being asserted by medicine is now quite limited. 
The key document, Good Medical Practice, sets out what is expected of doctors by way of conduct 
and values. It can been seen as an expression of the professional moral identity of medicine. It has a 
long pedigree, having developed from the old ‘Blue Book’, which was essentially a catalogue of 
misbehaviours that might lead doctors to be ‘struck off’ the register. It became recast into a set of 
values and standards to which doctors should aspire as well as adhere in the first edition under the 
title of Good Medical Practice in 2005. The current revision of the guidance, dating from 2013,49 has 
sought to return to a more focussed and limited account of issues that might reflect on continuing 
registration and is therefore less aspirational, but it is still about good medical practice rather than 
bad. Under this umbrella, the GMC issued document initially entitled Supplementary Guidance on 
Personal Beliefs and now known as Personal Beliefs and Medical Practice,50 which required doctors 
to ‘set aside their personal beliefs where this is necessary in order to provide care in line with the 
principles in GMP.’ 
The current version of Good Medical Practice (2013) addresses potential problems about bringing 
personal views into the clinic by warning against expressing personal beliefs in a way that exploits 
patients’ vulnerability or is likely to cause them distress (para 54) and setting out a prohibition on 
‘unfairly discriminating’ by allowing personal views to affect treatment  (para 59). So the harms are 
exploitation, distress and discrimination – defining limitations on the acceptable use of discretion 
rather than indicating how to exercise it. Against this background, Personal Beliefs and Medical 
Practice uses the term ‘conscientious objection’ in ways that go significantly beyond the statutory 
legal recognitions. It includes as examples the signing of cremation certificates, referral for 
treatments that cause infertility, contraception (including emergency contraception), 51 and 
withdrawal of life-prolonging treatment.52 These are recognised as personal to individual doctors 
and are balanced against professional responsibilities that need to be met when exercising personal 
conscientious objection – making patients aware of objections in advance when possible; being open 
with employers, partners and colleagues; telling patients that you are exercising an objection, that 
they have the right to see another practitioner and providing them with enough information to 
make arrangements to do so.53  Finally the GMC guidance identifies that employers and those 
contracting for services ‘are entitled to require doctors to fulfil contractual requirements that may 
restrict doctors’ freedom to work in accordance their conscience.’54  
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This takes us to questions of the nature of employment contracts for health professionals, the 
second area for consideration. If we accept that exercise of conscience is expected, and that this 
may conflict with institutional priorities, how can we reconcile the tensions that will inevitably 
emerge in contested areas of treatment? Such a problem arose in the employment law case of Owen 
v Coventry HA,55 concerning a nurse who had principled objections to the use of electro-convulsive 
therapy (ECT) but who was working in a unit where doctors used it. The case elicited a distinction 
between circumstances when it was reasonable for nurse to refuse to co-operate with medical 
instructions and those when it was not. This was cast in professional identity terms - conflict 
between the duty as an employee to follow employers’ instructions and that as a professional to 
protect the safety of patients 
Owen was dismissed for refusing to co-operate with ECT treatment for a patient in his care. He 
argued that his objection to it was based on his professional judgment and that it was unreasonable 
to expect him to follow medical orders to participate in the treatment. In legal terms this was 
because, in the light of his claimed right to object, the doctors’ treatment proposal did not constitute 
a ‘lawful and reasonable instruction’ that his contract of employment obliged him to obey. The case 
concerned the care of a Mrs M who on 27 July 1982 was scheduled for ECT, when Owen was looking 
after her. He formally requested to be excused from this, writing that ‘I am convinced she is dying 
and that therefore this treatment is inappropriate.’ The situation was reviewed by the nursing officer 
who did not accept this assessment. Two days later, Mrs M was again scheduled for ECT and Owen 
refused to take any part in the procedure. The Court of Appeal’s judgment notes pithily that ‘the 
Industrial Tribunal found that this refusal, at an hour's notice, caused some disruption.’  
This was not the first time the ECT issue had arisen. In earlier disciplinary proceedings Owen had 
received a formal written warning that he had been ‘repeatedly requested to carry out a reasonable 
instruction, namely to undertake clinical nursing duties in the ECT Department, to which you refused, 
stating that you objected to ECT as a treatment for patients and wished to be excluded from nursing 
duties in that department’ and he had been warned that this amounted to serious misconduct. In 
the subsequent enquiry into his refusal to take part in Mrs M’s care, which also sought to explore 
whether there was scope for Owen to be employed in roles that would avoid contact with ECT 
patients, he stated that ‘ECT was not a form of treatment with which he could agree in that it 
offended against his beliefs.’ He was dismissed. 
His dismissal was upheld by the Court of Appeal, noting the distinction between two claims about 
professional judgment. The first concerned patient safety. Owen claimed that this was ‘the real 
issue… Did the applicant act unreasonably in refusing to take part in the treatment of Mrs M on 29th 
July 1982 when his reason for refusing was his judgment as a professional staff nurse that such 
treatment for that patient on that occasion was not in her best interests?’  
The Court of Appeal rejected this analysis of the facts: 
The applicant's case might have been that he had deep and insuperable misgivings about 
taking part in the treatment of Mrs M on 29th July and that he had accordingly felt unable to 
assist but that, save in that case and on that occasion, he was willing to perform his nursing 
duties on any other occasion. That, however, was not the case which the applicant 
presented … at the enquiry on 31st August. It was not his case to the Appeal Tribunal... It 
was not the case raised in his originating application to the Industrial Tribunal, where his 
objection to ECT was put in general terms without reference to any particular patient and it 
was not his case put to the Industrial Tribunal, where his case was that he should have a 
conscientious right to object to ECT as he would have to abortion. 
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Consequently, the case concerned second category, principled objection to a type of treatment: 
Even giving full weight to the applicant's contention that he was professionally bound to 
express his concern in the interests of the patient if he thought treatment inappropriate, the 
applicant's conduct went well beyond what his professional duties required or permitted. On 
29th July he had not seen the patient nor, as I have said, formed any judgment on the 
patient. He had not discussed the matter with any medical practitioner and he did not 
ascertain whether the patient's condition had been re-assessed. He did nothing to bring his 
misgivings to the attention of those who carried out the treatment. He simply refused to 
have any part in the procedure. 
Consequently, his dismissal was reasonable. While it would have been proper for him to raise 
concerns about the use of ECT when the policies in the unit were being discussed, it was not 
appropriate for him to refuse to operate those policies while they were in force.  
The position might have been different had there been particular reasons for him to believe that the 
patient in question was being placed at some specific risk, that had not been taken into account by 
the doctors when they decided that ECT would be an appropriate treatment. In such circumstances, 
halting treatment while the situation was reconsidered would have been an appropriate 
professional response. This is recognised in various ways in early clinical negligence cases, which 
have noted that junior doctors are expected to refuse to follow instructions that are ‘manifestly 
wrong,’56 and nurses would be expected to seek confirmation of instructions that they are 
concerned about before proceeding. Although more recently the issues have been obscured by the 
operation of NHS Indemnity, which keeps apportionment issues away from the courts, professional 
guidance recognises the issues by setting out personal accountabilities for checking that patients are 
safe when implementing care planned by others.57 Such actions would involve objecting 
conscientiously, in accordance with their professional duties to protect individual patients’ interests, 
as required by the moral identity of the profession, irrespective of personal views. 
 
Conclusion: the anomalous nature of the statutory conscientious objection 
clauses 
 
From this analysis, it seems clear that the statutory conscience clauses (and the suggested 
extensions of conscientious objection in the GMC guidance) are anomalous when considered 
through the synchronic lens. They are blanket exemptions, inflexible and insufficiently responsive to 
circumstances to be understood as relating to the conscientious exercise of professional 
responsibilities. Instead, they serve to exempt professionals from even considering the situation in 
which patients find themselves and permit their decision to be based on matters that are unrelated 
to the specific circumstances of the patient. This prevents the statutory conscience clauses being 
defended as an example of a quasi-judicial discretion to plug an interpretive gap in the way that the 
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‘good faith’ requirement functions because it is not a matter of either interpretation of the legal 
terms or of examination of the woman’s circumstances. Nor can the clauses be justified on the basis 
that they protect the exercise of conscientious discretion in the deployment of the moral tradition of 
medicine, because they permit personal moral agency rather than the following of a professional 
identity. There is, thus, a radical inconsistency with the reasons for the general respect for 
conscientious professional discretion.  
If the statutory conscientious objection clauses relate to personal moral agency rather than 
professional identity, then the claims of professionals need to be balanced against the equivalent 
moral agency of women seeking services and organisations seeking to provide them. While the 
exclusion of life-threatening emergencies from the scope of section 4 of the Abortion Act 1967 
reflects the recognition that they are situations when the needs of women outweigh the 
conscientious objections of professionals, it does so very crudely. More generally, the availability of 
the clause leads to an exemption from any balancing exercise as the professional opts out of 
considering the circumstances of the woman. The implications of this insight can be traced in the 
Supreme Court decision in the Doogan case and concerns the different paradigms of (a) 
‘conscientious objection’ under section 4 of the Abortion Act 1967 and (b) claims to exemption from 
particular practices in the name of freedom of religious and conscience under Article 9 of the 
European Convention on Human Rights. This Article sets out a qualified right, and the Supreme Court 
argued that the blanket nature of the conscience clause meant that the provisions of this Article 
could not help indicate how construction of its scope would be consistent with the Convention. Any 
assessment about whether the limitations on Art 9 rights were proportionate would be ‘context 
specific and would not necessarily point to either a wider or narrow reading of section 4.’ 58 The 
scope of the clause needed to be ascertained by reference to standard canons of interpretation, 
leaving any questions of compatibility with the Convention open for subsequent scrutiny. 
Nevertheless, adoption by the Supreme Court of a narrow construction of the scope of the 
conscience clause has the effect of displacing, so far as was compatible with the legislation, issues of 
conscientious objection out of the Abortion Act (and health care law) into the context of 
employment law. Professionals are entitled to expect their employers to make reasonable 
adjustments to accommodate their beliefs, whether or not the statutory conscience clause applies.59 
This brings a different and more flexible legal framework into play. Although the Supreme Court 
rejected the opportunity to explain where this perspective would lead, it did so specifically because 
it anticipated that it would be sensitive to local matters and not a single universal opportunity to 
object to activities of which professionals disapproved.60 This will leave matters of personal belief by 
those undertaking the public roles of the health professions to be considered under the principles 
explored in the cases concerning civil registrars who have objections to the evolution of legal 
definitions of the marriages that they celebrate.61 This approach enables the courts to examine the 
balancing of the requirements of public roles, personal beliefs, and the rights and freedoms of 
others. The statutory conscience clauses have the effect of enabling personal beliefs to be 
automatically privileged over those other factors. As has been shown above, there is no justification 
for permitting this as an aspect of professional identity. Consequently, it follows that health 
professionals should be placed in a position that is equivalent to others with personal beliefs that 
may conflict with public expectations because the claims that they make are based on personal 
moral agency not the special status of professionals. 
                                                          
58 [2014] UKSC 68, [23]. 
59 [2014] UKSC 68, [24]. 
60 [2014] UKSC 68, [23]-[24], [27]. 
61
 See Ewieda v UK (2013) 57 EHRR 213, concerning the applicant Ms Ladele and the case Ladele v LB Islington 
[2009] EWCA Civ 1357. See also the second applicant Ms Chaplin who was a nurse claiming the right to wear a 
visible cross. 
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Returning to a diachronic perspective, this leaves open the question whether as a matter of the 
politics of the social contract between society and the professions it may continue to be an 
acceptable price to pay to offer doctors and nurses a special recognition for conscientious objection. 
We should not, however, confuse the messy politics of professional boundary work with the 
normative arguments around respect for professional identity and for personal moral agency. 
Statutory conscious objection clauses belong to the former sphere. The proper recognition of the 
value of supporting professionals to exercise professional power conscientiously is a different matter 
entirely.  
 
 
 
